

A PHILOSOPHY OF PURPOSE

BY

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Author of "A Sketch of a New Utilitarianism"



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I.

THE CALL WITHIN

The illimitable forest wilderness of the Laurentian Mountains, the sentinels of the mysterious North, contains a myriad life of ceaseless activity. There, remote for unnumbered ages, without any reference to that recent and temporary intruder Man, each of ten thousand varieties of creature, from the sensitive stag to the microscopic sandfly, pursues its career within the limits marked out for it, asking no questions.

Looking out across a beautiful lake, at the primeval woods clothing a long and lofty mountain ridge, Justus and his friend Chateauclair exchanged thoughts about Nature and Life.

Justus.—Why have you not put your views into writing.

Chateauclair.—Because my equipment of information is too meagre. I have never had time to keep thoroughly read, since I published a pamphlet containing a form of these ideas, in 1887. One effect of an education is that we get a respect for the world of learning and its chiefs, so I know well that Philosophy is large and I am small. I feel that I have at most but one little contribution to offer, one little pilaster for the temple—my ethical theory and its corollaries. Has it any value, and would it be understood? My only encouragement is that I do not know anyone who takes quite the same line of argument.

Justus.—But you have always kept some touch with that particular study; you had a university training in philosophy, and were well read as a young man. You were taught by such scholars as Clark-Murray and Osler: and Thomas Davidson and Bradwardine Hodgson encouraged you.

Chateauclair.—A generous friendship no cold medium knows.

Justus.—Look at the drama of independent lives before us here. Each of these wild creatures follows the call of the world spirit, instinct, and plays his little allotted part with confidence. You have the same instinctive call within you—to say your say.

Chateauclair.—Take the little, fat groundhog. He has his hole under yonder stump. I admit that he is not worried about the fact that he is a clumsy, shortlegged, whistling absurdity. His run is but some yards long, his food common weeds and roots, his fears few and not clever,—is that the analogy?

Justus.—He lives out his assigned life: he makes his few little efforts just as though they were important business. If your views are correct, he is one of the innumerable eyes of the Eternal, and his pleasure part

of the vast happiness of the universe; just as you speak of the thousands of skygazing frogs who dream in the sunshine along these shores.

Chateaufclair.—Yes: That is a conclusion of mine,—in the plan of the Eternal, failure is not failure, since the individual who fails in his short-sighted end always achieves some longer-sighted end. I suppose, then, I must say my say like the little fellow under the stump.

Iustus.—Let us go over the subject.

Chateaufclair.—These are the points upon which I think I have something to express:

1. An original viewpoint regarding the Will, linking together all action, all intelligence, all feeling and all evolution, into what I call an intelligible system of Purpose. Others have done so, but not in the same way.

2. A resulting explanation of ethical action, as the reasoning and action of a Deeper Self, of which each conscious individual is a branch. Others have done this too, but not in ways which satisfy my mind.

3. A faculty, inherent in all conscious beings, of coalescing their consciousness with that of other conscious beings. I call it the Law of Coalescence of Egos. (By this faculty, for example, our complicated brain consciousness is formed from the union of the consciousnesses of millions of brain-cells and related neurones. By the same law, our consciousness is united with the Deeper Self, and other consciousnesses outside us.)

4. A theory of personality to meet the problem of What becomes of the individual consciousness after death? All these theories are connected with one another. They relate to the perennial subjects of Altruism, Design, Life, Death and non-human existence, and are attempts at the solution according to a single line of thought.

II.

WHAT IS PURPOSE?

Iustus.—I should like to hear your view regarding the Will.

Chateaufclair.—It began, as you know, in an analysis of the Altruistic Act. I was not satisfied with any of the schools of theory which attempted to account for ethical action. They are enumerated and compared in the histories of ethics. Those which referred the rightness of an action to the mere command of a Higher Power gave no real solution. It was the solution of Sultan and slave. Those which found a reason in the attributions of wisdom or perfect Reason to such a Power were better, but indefinite. The Intuitionists (who posited a special innate Moral Faculty giving out its commands) were lofty but indefinite and barren of clear content. They have been well attacked by recent critics like James. The Hedonistic solution (Pleasure) was felt, even in its refined Epicurean form, to be too gross. It was the morality of the boar or horse. The

Utilitarian schools ("the greatest happiness of the greatest number") advanced far, for their end was large and happiness as an aim one could understand, but they failed to logically unravel the mental process by which the individual was brought to act for the happiness of others than himself. The crucial test was pure martyrdom—where the agent actually puts an end to himself and all his own happiness. Utilitarians tried to explain it according to Associationism by intellectual pleasure in the happiness of others, Schopenhauer by the operation of sympathy. Neither of these accounts for the typical fact.

In analyzing the altruistic act of the martyr, the operation was found of some element swaying the individual, which yet was not the human individual, and was aiming at things beyond the individual—a reasoning, purposive Power acting as an instinct and carrying the martyr on toward ends entirely beyond himself.

A psychological point, quite rudimentary in itself, here requires the closest attention. It is that *the only comprehensible purpose of any kind must be a happiness or the avoidance of a pain*. If one stops to reflect, nothing else is known to us which is of any interest or value. Lotze expresses this well in "Microcosmos." *All facts are indifferent to us if they produce no results in happiness or pain*. This significance of the facts of feeling is what I most insist on. It is the key to my views and reasoning.

Of what nature then was that power which in the act of martyrdom could impel the individual to act towards the happiness of others against his own? Obviously, it must understand happiness and pain; and in a realm beyond the individual.

The investigation thus led beneath the consciousness of the individual into the realm of the subconscious.

Marvelling at this, I found that the altruistic act was not alone in having as its basis such an instinct, but that all instincts were at root, of a similar character,—manifestations of an underlying reasoning, purposive, conscious Power, impelling the individual to ends which were based on the same principle, i.e. on Feelings. And not only all *instincts* were of that character, but also all *functions* of the body, all common instincts of herds, all interlocking instincts such as those of the mother and her sucking babe. All of them showed reasoning, all of them were directed to happiness-objects, quite independently of any reasoning of the conscious individual. A very small part of life is ordered by human conscious reasoning, which itself is merely revealed instinct, or rather both are outcrops of the same conscious reasoning in the wider world.

Further reflection showed that, besides the instincts and functions, Biological Evolution too, in the course of which all these results were produced, is a part of the same process—a reasoned course of action directed to happiness-ends. Instinct, function and evolution are but Reasoning in another form. Moreover, Biological Evolution is part of, and could not succeed without that part of the cosmic process which

proceeds outside of the realm of life as we know it,—the making of stars, suns, worlds, atmospheres, oceans, and other environments, to which Life becomes adapted in the course of Ages. This also performs its part in the purposive scheme, as proved by its action contributing to happiness-results, the only real proof of purpose. The whole scheme of the known Universe thus became evident as one of conscious Purpose,—the principle of all action within it.

Justus.—Where do you differ from Butler, Paley and their modern followers—those who set up the received Arguments from Design and Order?

Chateaucclair.—Apply to them what I have said is the key to the whole question—that *feelings* are the only class of aims which can *prove* that any action is purposive,—at least apart from mere appearances of analogy to human purposes, which do not hold outside the human sphere. Paley based his famous argument on the conclusion that because, if a man found a watch he would infer a designer, he would as necessarily infer a designer of the universe from the wonders of physiology and astronomy. That argument fails against the reply that it is possible that such regularity and symmetry are merely the immanent make-up of the universe, are dead lead to nothing of interest and have no end that is not indifferent. Why could not an accidental dead universe exist which was symmetrical instead of chaotic? All the rocky masses of these great hills are of crystalline shapes and cleavages.

On the other hand, if they can be shown to be parts of a process leading constantly to conditions favoring happiness and away from pain, they would have at once a meaning and a value even if totally unsymmetrical; for we could understand them as purposive. The Argument from Symmetry—which is Paley's real stand—is an illusory one.

Justus.—By what explanation, do you reconcile the primitive law of the selfish individual act with that of the unselfish altruistic act?

Chateaucclair.—These two apparently contradictory laws are really identical. The whole of the actions of the universe are performed on one and the same simple plan,—typified by the typical act of the amoeba. When the primitive lump of living jelly is seen under the microscope to come against a piece of food, it throws out projections of its jelly-like surface, envelops, and enjoys the food. Essentially, this act is that of the *moving of matter towards a happiness-end to be enjoyed by the subject*. This is just what the Deeper Self does in altruism. In doing so it apparently overrides the narrower happiness of the individual actor.

Justus.—How do we know whether creatures of such a low order as the amoeba are conscious?

Chateaucclair.—That is a separate argument. It has been fully argued out by others. The essentials of its act are (1) the power to move matter; (2) in order to attain a feeling: those are the essentials of all Purpose. In the selfish act the ordinary conscious individual alone is concerned: in the altruistic, the power moving the ordinary conscious

individual is in fact a larger individual of which the ordinary one is a part or branch. The Deeper Self—the Tree of which the ordinary is a branch, includes other living beings, and at its deepest the entire universe, all of it conscious and feeling, on the same lines as we are.

Morphologists have accumulated a whole literature of disputation as to what is the typical "individual." In the vegetable world different writers hold it to be the plant, the leaf, the bud, the tree, the cell, the molecule or the atom. Some regard the tree as but a colony of buds, or of cells. Let us try to solve the similar problems for the world of consciousness. The first wonderful and satisfactory thing is that such a power belongs to us. The second is that the whole universe has that power.

Justus.—But there are some well-known objections to Purpose in the universe. For example, that the universe-action is conflicting; it is simultaneously behind the instinct of the mother-buffalo to defend her calf from the wolves, and of the wolf-pack to systematically encircle the buffalo. The reasoned aim of the former instinct is the happiness of the buffalo race, that of the other the happiness of the wolf race.

Chateauclair.—If we lay aside our fearsome interpretations of death and struggle, these are but lesser parts of a broader good process.

Justus.—The process is at least imperfect.

Chateauclair.—It seems so, from our point of view. But the apparent imperfection at least does not destroy the general success of the scheme. My argument is not for a perfect process, but simply to record the fact. Yet in the higher achievements of Evolution the results are enormously improved, so that humanity may look for further improvement in the future. And doubtless we also regard the lower orders of Life from an artificial standpoint. They are not troubled by imagination and regard death as a sleep.

Justus.—Another contention is that the general result of our cosmic environment is a surplus of pains; and hence that we cannot conclude that the Universe, or any effective Power in it, acts for happiness.

Chateauclair.—In other words the attitude of the Pessimists. One answer would seem to be that we are not altogether helpless; we have some power to seek and to flee.

Justus.—Again, that Nature is reckless of the individual.

Chateauclair.—Not if she is serving the Deeper Self of that individual, and taking care of its hidden future and larger extent of interests.

Justus.—Then there is the objection that the wonderful contrivances of Evolution are but the results of an unfeeling mechanical selection by obliteration of the unfit to survive.

Chateauclair.—That would give us only a set of elaborate machines, contrived for self-perpetuation, but without any relation to feeling;—whereas in fact Feeling is the object served by all the contrivances in question. That is the test.

Justus.—Some maintain that Feeling is on the contrary only the

servant of the machines of Evolution,—that pain is the red flag of danger of a smash, and pleasure the green sign of a perfectly running physique.

Chateaucclair,—What they really mean by the smash of the machine is the pain it would bring. What difference would it make to us how perfect or imperfect our bodies were, so long as their perfection or imperfection made no kind of difference to our happiness? And if an imperfect body were accompanied by all kinds of happiness to us would we not prefer it? Or if a perfectly running physique were accompanied by all kinds of agony, how readily we would exchange it.

Justus,—You have spoken of the inorganic Universe—that part outside of the wide family of consciousness known to us, the protoplasmic Race, which began in the Ocean?

Chateaucclair,—That also falls within the same evolutionary movement and must be conscious. Few conclusions seem more absurd than that Life is confined to the protoplasmic Race. It stands, in logic, with the idea of Man as the monarch and goal of the Universe; with the Creation in seven clock days; with the Chosen People; and other historical theological myths abandoned during the past fifty years. Has all this marvellous life itself sprung out of nothing? Have this petty corner of the cosmos, and these few moments of eternity been all there ever was of any import?

Justus,—Well, what if Life were meteor-borne from another water-bearing planet? Space is filled with incredible numbers of small meteors and flying debris, and meteoric dust is constantly falling on us in an invisible rain.

Chateaucclair,—That only carries the absurdity a step further back, and a highly improbable step. Let us not stop, in our hypotheses of the conditions of life, at the nebulae, at molten and vaporous temperatures astronomical distances, unlimited shapes and forms of intelligence. James Hinton, the brilliant surgeon, gave the world some striking reflections on this "Life in Nature." I want rather to work it out on a basis of fact, and I think there is a lead in the facts of the purposive consciousness shown by the feelings.

II.

COALESCENCE OF EGOS

Justus,—What do you mean by your theory of Coalescence of Egos?

Chateaucclair,—I feel that some regular explanation is necessary to account for the unity of action between the ordinary Individual Self and the Deeper Self—or more accurately, the relations between them. I find it in a law of Coalescence of Egos—applying not merely to them but to all the forms of consciousness we know. I had better read you my

paper, the infliction of which you will endure with your usual forbearance.

"By most analysts of consciousness, the unity and perpetual identity of the 'I' of psychology has long been held to be a cardinal doctrine, notwithstanding the various views of recent time advancing different types of 'double' and 'multiple' personality, identifications of the self with the body, and other like tenets. I do not recall that any of these latter views suggests any *law of consciousness* for united personalities. I venture to think there is an explanation of many difficulties in what may be termed 'coalescence of egos'—analogous to the coalescence of focuses of light;—in short that *every conscious unit has a faculty of coalescing, and of decoalescing, its consciousness with that of any other conscious unit.*

To go over some familiar ground, and (for the sake of avoiding the unnecessary details of the standard discussion) to use the simplest examples.

1. Taking for granted, for the moment that types like the amoeba and the white blood corpuscle have conscious life and therefore an ego, what other thesis will explain the psychological side of the fact that a fragment of one, broken off even accidentally, lives on and acts like the original amoeba? Apparently before the division the creature had yet one self, but has two after it. True, several arguments are advanced against the contention that such early life is conscious at all. It is said that chemical and physical processes sufficiently explain the movements of protozoa and cell-life. But if we had not our own consciousness as a guide, we should have to admit the same objection to be applicable to human life; and even in the most conscious forms of willing, we never escape the parallelism of the material world,—the appearance of purely mechanical, non-conscious action. It is also objected that our functional forms of internal bodily life go on without our consciousness, and that these correspond to the lower forms of animal life, which it is claimed are probably therefore unconscious. (The extreme automatism of Descartes—that even higher animals below man are but machines—is mostly abandoned to-day.) But to this it may be answered that instincts and functions are the records of ancient acts and habits which began as conscious ones, and even now certain acts of ours, highly conscious at first, gradually become subconscious habits. Is it not then more probable that each protozoön has its own vivid consciousness from moment to moment. We know that a child's feelings are very intense while they last, but speedily pass into oblivion. They have both these characteristics from a very early stage. This momentary vivid consciousness, without memory or complicated content, may well be the primitive cell-being's. On the hypothesis of coalescence, our so-called unconscious nerve-apparatus is simply carrying on its own cell-consciousness separately from the consciousness in which we ordinarily move. There is in my estimation, yet another proof of such a consciousness in all lower life; it is drawn from the universality of the plan of all conscious action of every kind—aimed at happiness and away from pain. Here I must repeat

myself. This *aiming** characterizes not only all the acts of living beings of all kinds, but all our acts of conscious willing, all altruistic acts, all habit, instinct, function and evolution. It necessarily presumes "feeling" and therefore consciousness, in the protozoa and cells. Being aimed at, and guided towards, facts of feeling, it cannot be explained without them. Our willing is but part of the universal process of evolution, which itself is a process of evidently conscious willing. And since we are part of that process, both physically and mentally, our individual "selves" are parallel with a Self as universal as Evolution, a Self apparently throwing off individual selves as its representatives and living in them. How does it do so? My explanation is the Law of Coalescence posited above. It lives in them by means of this faculty of coalescence. This is a more definite thought than either "indwelling" or "absorption," as commonly stated.

2. The typical lines of the amoeba example apply to all known forms of reproduction of life, i.e. division of one kind or another, and separate ego-life in the divided or gemmated parts. Here is *division of egos*. The notion that with each of these divisions a new self—permanently thereafter a unique ego, a "myself," and a unity—arises would seem to be no more tenable than that an individual brick is permanently a simple indivisible unit.

3. In bisexual reproduction, not only is there gemmation—in effect gemmation from both parents—but these two gemmated units, each apparently with its conscious ego, unite into one body and one mind. Here is plain coalescence of egos.

4. Thereafter, with growing consciousness, and more particularly with growing memory, connecting the temporal moments of consciousness, the body adds more and more cells, becoming more and more complex, and the mind also advances, with the development of the nervous system and brain, until ultimately it becomes the mind of the full-grown man's consciousness as we know it, with the clear ego. And if, conversely, the nerve development be arrested, the mind's growth is arrested *pari passu*.

5. My hypothesis is that the egos of the innumerable separate cells of the body keep coalescing more or less completely with the central ones and each other. If for example the cells of one of my fingers receive an injury, I am conscious of the mental processes accompanying that injury: at the same time the cells of the finger tissues are conscious of it also, and these two consciousnesses become one, in the same way as that of the broken amoeba may be considered to have been one as regards an injury to one of its parts before the part was broken off;—the part also being apparently as conscious after the injury as it would be if it occurred after the breaking off, when the part became another sentient individual. Again, every time I say "I forgot," I refer to some decoalescence which

* Cf. Part I.

took place previously. This is where the "mental latency" of Hamilton comes in.

6. The ego, or its consciousness, is not attached to the actual particles of matter, since these are changed in a comparatively short time by waste and renewal. It may be attached to the form or the atomic structure, in some respect; but, however, that may be, at the moment before gemmation, the particles and their form are part of the original mass, as the medium, if not the home, of their egos, and the reasoning is the same.

7. Consciousness, in our actual Experience, never consists of a single element; but is always exceedingly complex, as all know who have ever tried to record all the elements present in an ordinary moment of consciousness. What with clear and subconscious presentations, and boundless shadowy suggestions, there is no such mighty engine-room as a soul. We find each of these presentations and suggestions connected with the life-operations of some local cell or cell-group. By what process are they psychologically bound into one continuing whole (continuum)? Do not the lower blend with the higher in the same states of consciousness.

8. Is the process this:—that the continuum of our consciousness consists of a series of constantly changing groups of units of consciousness (consisting each of a subject—and—object aspect) constantly coalescing together and receding from coalescence? And that this power of coalescing and decoalescing is an innate law of consciousness? Does the larger, more permanent, more vivid group, call itself the "I"? This part of my theory resembles the family of theories of the kind

9. Is it not erroneous to think that we cannot conceive ourselves except as separate from each other, when embryology and histology appear to prove that we were once united; and when so many streams combine in our mental life; and when we move so inevitably with the movement of the whole conscious as well as the apparently unconscious world? Why then should it be asserted so positively by certain analysts of consciousness that "I am I, altogether separate from every other I"—"I can never be another"—"I shall remain unique to all eternity, or absolutely die"—"I am indivisible"—"I am the same throughout all my states of consciousness"—"To unite with another would be to lose my identity"—"It would be equivalent to eternal extinction." Are these propositions really correct? Are we not noting but superficially an apparent unity—the psychological presentation of our own unanalyzed consciousness? Is not its apparent unity after all indivisible? When I say "I," ought I not to say "we"? Is not the Eg. a Nos?

We have each a separate general individuality running through our lives; but is it not a cluster of coalescences around a central dominant Ego; and do not the facts of coalescence themselves refuse us the right to insist on the old kind of permanent and indivisible separation? And do they not claim for us an infinite world of conscious union?"

Justus.—I have been most patient. But allow me to remark that it might have been better for you to have set forth with exactitude the his-

tory of the many works and discussions on some of these points, such as the identification of the self with the body, the revolt against Intellectualism, and so on.

Chateaucclair.—My aim was to discuss what seemed to me the essential points, rather than to state the literature upon them, or all the opinions.

III.

LIFE AND DEATH

Justus.—Assuming the correctness of your views, to wit: Universal consciousness, acting everywhere on the same fundamental plan of reasoned action for happiness and a law of universal coalescence and decoalescence of Egos;—

What becomes of our life at death?

Chateaucclair.—Leaving aside cases of acute disease:—we see some aged parent die before our eyes. For months the slow, disintegrating process of mild senility has impaired the hearing, sight and memory, and enfeebled the limbs, until at length the final hour arrives. We have noted not only the forgetfulness, but the gentle illusions that mark the dissolving of the coördinating connection between his states of mind,—a form of decoalescence, and which sometimes has even taken the shape of divided personality, where the patient supposed himself to be some other individual. A state of dreaming comes on. Perception is dull and comparison is departing, the grasp of arithmetical calculations fails, heavy reasoning ends in confusion. If the process last, both mind and body fall together in complete disarrangement and dissolution, like those of King Lear. But should the end come before the process gets too far, there is the spectacle of a gentle and beautiful withdrawal of a soul;—the last good-byes, the paternal blessing, the gradual sinking into coma, and then the complete disappearance of mortal consciousness. And this followed by the chemical dissolution of the body.

What has happened?

Where are now all that grandeur of physique, that mental mastery, those wondrous affections, that marvellous memory, those treasures of skill,—in a word that noble structure which we called the man? Have all perished? It is hard to believe they shall never return.

We must agree that in the dead body the protoplasmic vehicle of consciousness no longer exists as such. The avenues of human consciousness are gone. Not only has the eye ceased to be a sight-machine, and the neurones to be receivers of impressions and transmitters of actions, but the machinery of the subconscious actions of the stomach, heart and lungs, the obscurer processes of the viscera, of the small arteries, the lymphatics, and a thousands others, fail. The body therefore no longer avails in discussion of the question. Its material is preyed upon by, and partly taken up into the structure of, many protozoa, plants

and other living organisms, and partly is disseminated as chemical elements into the soil, the atmosphere, and the general constitution of the world. The customary machinery for coalescence of those many conscious egos which made up the human mind is gone, and with it their coalescence.

What then?

The consciousness of each of these egos,—including the one or more which dominated the colony called the ordinary individual,—either is lost or is reduced to its last element or elements.

How far downwards does this process go? Certainly to dissolution of the cells. But is or is not, the atom left undissolved, or the electrons? And why is organic matter so readily taken up into living organisms?

My theory is as follows:—

That the association of the conscious ego with the body is not a fixed association with the particular particles of matter composing the body; these are constantly changing. But the association is with the form. This is an old and obvious idea, and remains unchanged despite the elaborate researches of the chemico and physico-biologists. What that form, or arrangement of particles necessary to conscious existence, may be is a question for the biologists. It is as though one's ego were looking through a window, the panes of which might be changed from time to time. As long as the window remains the same (apart from the changes of panes) the ego sees. As new windows are opened, the ego sees more things. If the windows are imperfect, it sees imperfectly. Finally the windows are closed, and the ego ceases to look out.

That our egos have conditions of place and time, and are movable, appears from their association with bodies. There are, in my view, innumerable egos, *the ultimate points of personality*, each probably exactly similar, each capable of infinite life, each indestructible, each endowed with infinite capacity of coalescence with all the others, like particles of water in the ocean. This theory ought not to be confused with the Monads of Leibnitz, although there are some resemblances.

Even when reduced to its ultimate element or elements by the dissolution of the body, there remain in each its infinite capacity and tendency of coalescence. Its nature is to again begin the process—to take part in new coalescences. Such is the source of the constant tendency of protoplasmic matter, and of all matter, to become arranged into cells, chains of cells, and other forms favorable to the appearance of life—in other words, presenting those "windows" of form through which the conscious ego, the ultimate point of personality, looks out upon the world. Crystallization would seem to be of the same nature: all matter is of crystalline or in some way analogous structure.

Do our conscious egos lose consciousness at death? There is one element that throws light on that. The Deeper Self revealed in altruistic, instinctive and Evolutionary action, evidently continues its larger and conscious action outside of and independently of the human body. True

at death it also loses the "windows of the now dissolved body, with its local instinctive and functional machinery. But it goes on immortally acting, feeling, reasoning, purposive, throughout the rest of the world.

If the doctrine of coalescence be correct, then the ultimate element of individual personality does not lose connection with that undying greater Element but continues to benefit by its consciousness, for which the machinery (the outer world of life) has not disappeared.

Taking for granted that this Deeper Self has the purposive marks of clear and deep consciousness—although to us it has appeared internally as only subconscious—then the individual consciousness of the deceased falls back into an infinite field of consciousness. There it is not lost like a drop in the Ocean—it is expanded sooner or later, by the same process as our human consciousness expands from the infant to the man.

Moreover, on no purposive plan can our ego be regarded as extinct. On the contrary, is it not more likely that as our ego leaves the body, it grows without delay into some new degree of the consciousness of the Deeper Self.

The scheme of consciousness would appear to indicate one infinite and highly concentrated central consciousness,—perhaps not perfect, but always able to flee from pain and to obtain happiness for all, constantly opening "windows" and pushing forth organized lives in all directions and grades, living in them all, each for its time and place, and each of those lives, for its part, partaking also of the universal Life with which it is temporarily in dimly conscious connection. Our human lives are therefore like leaves—temporary offshoots on the tree, each with a limited completeness of its own, not essentially affecting the larger life but a means of expressing part of it. Like leaves they fulfil their office and fall away. In a different interpretation they recall the Homeric line:

"The race of men is like the race of leaves."

We are not really part of the world we see. We are observers looking through windows: we belong to the other world. That world, the world of the Deeper Self is not a sleep, a dreaming, a subliminal sphere, a world of the Unconscious, of blind Will or Intelligence, of *Élan Vital*,—but one of bright and highly developed consciousness, with mind-features and feeling-features beyond our imagination. Our personality and knowledge would be vastly increased in scope, not lessened, by "the fall of the leaf."

What about memory?

The Deeper Self acts on a scheme which implies memory. Its machinery is on some related plan to our brain-structure. One form in which we get its memory is what has been called "hereditary memories" of instinctive action. What we feel as subconscious is simply the half-way house between our full consciousness and the full consciousness of the Deeper Self,—the halfway link between two conscious worlds of ours.

No fruit of consciousness, apparently, is ever lost. A similar law to that of the Conservation of Energy can be posited—the Law of the Conservation of Consciousness. Such are the conclusions I would draw from the facts of Feeling, and their conduct in the Altruistic Act.

Justus.—These views differ considerably from well-known conceptions—such as Extinction of the Individual, Absorption into an Infinite Being, obliteration of the personal consciousness, Nirvana, blind will struggling to live, and the various notions of spiritualism and theological tradition. William James seems to hold something partly analogous—judging from a letter to Bergson in 1907, in which, attributing man's spiritual aspirations to suggestions through an extension of his subliminal self, he uses the phrase "coalescence with the Divine."

Chateaucclair.—But the approach of James to the problem is very different, and so are the other features of his theory.

To one point of view men should make up their minds; after death we shall still form part of the same universe, and very possibly inhabit this same globe for ages (of which all the protoplasmic forms are a kind of leafage), continue to visit somewhat similar scenes,—if in other ways,—and to move through aspects and events not unrelated to those on which we look through our present "windows."

Our life is not temporary and bounded by a few years or a few miles, but is the total and eternal evolutionary life. And as with the future, so with the past. We have often lived before. These trees, these dawns, these friends, that seem so familiar, and heavenly; are the old dawns, the old groves, the old friends, modified by progress and history.

Our life has been, and eternally shall be, a continuity, seeking and ever more successfully gaining and giving (which are the same thing) happiness, and escaping and shielding from (which are the same thing) pain; in deep and perpetual oneness and growing coalescence, with that Race—which is our true Race,—the boundless Universe, indwelt and moved by its universal Nos, and winning to wards that wondrous perfection of Happiness which the great religious instinct dreams of as Heaven.

MONTREAL, September 22, 1920.